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Abstract: 
Impact investments are emerging as a new asset class of social finance, sometimes driven 
by multinational enterprises as part of their strategic corporate social responsibility strategy. 
These investments intend to create positive societal impact beyond a financial return through 
the development of social enterprises. Scholars have highlighted the conflicting institutional 
logics that these later hybrid organizations must face when combining social welfare and 
profitability. Yet we lack in-depth insight into how impact investing funds are building their 
own accountability and legitimacy, and more specifically how they are responding to their 
investor’s pressure to manage societal impact. This paper builds on a three year action-
research program conducted with Schneider Electric, a multinational enterprise specialized in 
energy management. The company initiated and sponsored an impact investing fund 
targeting energy access ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa, alongside four Development 
Finance Institutions. Grounded in neo-institutional and resource dependence theories, the 
article analyzes the perceptions of the fund’s managers and suggests a pattern of strategic 
responses. The fund initially conformed to the emerging values and practices of the industry 
motivated by a search for salient legitimacy. Then they turned to find a compromise when 
facing operational complexity, and negotiated the increasing number of requirements from 
their investors. The paper further provides recommendation for social innovation actors in 
adopting a performance-oriented approach for managing societal value creation. 
 
Keywords: Impact Investing – base of the pyramid – Multinational Enterprises – Institutional 
theory – resource dependence theory – action-research – case study 
                                               
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the ANR/Investissements d'avenir (ANR -11- 
IDEX-0003-02). the chair for Sustainable Finance and Responsible Investments (FDIR), and the chair Énergy and 
Prosperity at the Fondation du Risque (ILB). 
Managing Societal Performance of Impact Investing   
André, T.  2/37 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, a new asset class of social finance has emerged. A recent study on 
125 impact investing funds revealed a cumulative commitment of USD 46 billion of direct 
investments mostly in companies (78%) active in emerging markets (70%) (Saltuk, El Idrissi, 
Bouri, Mudaliar, & Schiff, 2014). Impact investments in social enterprises active in 
microfinance and financial services, energy, housing, food and agriculture, healthcare or 
education aim at tackling societal needs of low-income populations also referred to as the 
Base of the Pyramid (BoP). Such investments are promised to exponentially grow over the 
next decade, reaching at least USD 400 billion available for impact-oriented ventures 
(O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, Bugg-Levine, & Brandenburg, 2010). This constitutes a 
promising opportunity for both social enterprises that are currently undercapitalized, and 
policy makers aiming to boost their social and environmental sustainability commitments 
through economic development (Mendell & Barbosa, 2013). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
have also embarked among impact investors by launching corporate venture capital funds 
thus imitating government behavior. This is the case of Danone and Mars and their 
Livelihoods 3F fund, Engie and its Rassembleurs d’Energies fund, or Schneider Electric and 
its Energy Access Venture Fund. Aligned with their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
strategy, these funds help MNEs to further commit at the BoP by investing in external social 
enterprises and generate competitive advantage through innovative business ventures 
screening.  
As a nascent industry, impact investing has not yet attracted much scholar study. A first 
common definition describes their investments as intended to explicitly create positive social 
and/or environmental impact beyond financial return (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). As such, 
impact investing differs from Socially Responsible Investments (SRI) in the sense that 
societal impact is a primary concern for investors, potentially inducing a tradeoff between 
financial (i.e. on the Internal Rate of Return – IRR) and societal (i.e. on Environmental, Social 
and Governance – ESG – criteria) expectations.  
Similar to social enterprises or microfinance organizations in which they invest, impact 
investing funds can be described as “hybrid” organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smith, 
Gonin, & Besharov, 2013). In that sense, they need to combine two potentially conflicting 
logics, namely a social welfare and a commercial logic (Jay, 2013). Standing in a shared 
value perspective (Porter & Kramer, 2011), impact investing funds are urged by their own 
investors and stakeholders at large to manage and report their societal performance 
alongside their traditional financial one. However, impact investing funds evolve in an 
institutional change within which values, beliefs, practices and rules are still structuring and 
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no standards exist yet (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). Examining the shared value 
commitment of the impact investing industry has not been systemically carried out. 
Therefore, the paper aims at understanding how impact investing funds are managing these 
combined commercial and societal performance objectives in order to build accountability 
and legitimacy within their value chain. 
The paper is built on the in-depth case study (Eisenhardt  & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) of 
Energy Access Ventures Fund (EAVF), an impact investing fund aggregating total assets of 
€ 54.5 million and targeting energy access ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa. The case is 
grounded in an action-research partnership (Rapoport, 1970) initiated in late 2011 with 
Schneider Electric. The company is a global leader in energy management that actually 
launched and sponsored the project in the context of its access to energy program targeting 
the Base of the Pyramid. This case study analyzes the design of the fund until the date of its 
closing in early 2015 and the negotiations that took place between the fund’s managers and 
its investors, namely its corporate sponsor and four Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). 
While the fund’s managers attracted the DFIs based on common beliefs and aspirations in 
impact investing, the later enforced them to consider numerous requirements prior their 
investment in EAVF. Constraints such as a minimum internal rate of return, a limited share of 
organizational and management fees to support the investees or a high level of expectation 
to monitor societal benefits of each investment appeared potentially conflicting to the fund’s 
managers. Pertaining to our research question on building impact investing fund’s 
accountability and legitimacy, the article further aims at examining how EAVF is responding 
to these pressures and more specifically to manage its societal performance. Such inquiry 
would also provide MNEs the knowledge to apprehend the societal performance of their 
externally managed BoP activities or impact investing funds. 
In order to study the EAVF managerial perceptions and strategic responses to these 
pressures we ground the case in neo-institutional and resource dependence theories, as 
initiated by (Oliver, 1991). Institutional theory has been well mobilized to study hybrid 
organizations such as social enterprises (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013), microfinance 
organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), and Social Responsible Investments (Arjalies, 
2013). Early writings in institutional theory mostly predicted conformity to dominant norms 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, recent writings emphasize that factors such as agency, 
choice, proactiveness and self-interest can lead to a variety of more resistive responses 
(Jamali, 2010; Oliver, 1991; Tan & Wang, 2011).  
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In our case study, EAVF did not adopt blindly dominant norms as no explicit societal 
performance management standards were either shared within the impact investing industry 
or agreed between the fund’s investors. The findings rather suggest that the fund conformed 
to the industry’s values and emerging practices as a natural strategic response to gain 
legitimacy and anticipate its potential investors’ expectations. In a second phase, EAVF 
searched for compromise when they faced the operational complexity of the procedure and 
negotiated the increasing number of requirements from its future investors. EAVF managers 
acknowledged their resource dependence towards the DFIs that somehow limited their 
bargaining power but permitted inter-organizational arrangements. The case study also 
discusses a potential risk for EAVF managers to avoid the DFIs requirements. The findings 
suggest that periodic discussions and renegotiations of the DFIs’ requirements would limit 
the risk to create a “legitimacy façade”. Finally, the research findings reassert a potential 
conflict – or a delicate balance – between societal and financial value creation objectives. 
The fund’s managers recognize that their newly established procedure embeds two logics 
that are potentially conflicting although not incompatible, while it could grant them legitimacy 
towards external rating and certifying bodies in due time. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
impact investing and societal performance management and then presents relevant 
institutional and resource dependence theories that were used to guide the empirical part of 
the paper based on the framework of Oliver (1991). Section 3 explains the research context 
as well as the grounding of the paper in Action Research and the case study methodology. 
Section 4 derives the theoretical framework on the strategic responses from an impact 
investing fund to institutional pressures. Section 5 discusses the findings. Finally, Section 6 
concludes this paper, provides recommendations for social innovation practitioners and 
suggests future research.  
2. LITTERATURE OVERVIEW 
2.1. Social innovation, impact investing and societal performance 
Social innovation and social finance 
The “social innovation” concept has recently regained corporate interest. Westley and 
Antadze (2010, p. 2) defined social innovation as being “a complex process of introducing 
new products, processes or programs that profoundly change the basic routines, resource 
and authority flows, or beliefs of the social system in which innovation occurs. Such 
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successful social innovations have durability and broad impact”. Social innovation 
encompasses terms such as “social enterprise,” “social entrepreneurship,” and “social 
finance”. One can witness the emergence of organizations that adopt commercial purposes 
to achieve societal objectives such as poverty alleviation, health and education provision or 
climate change resilience. For instance, multinational enterprises pursuing a corporate 
responsible strategy have embraced the possibility to find growth or strategic opportunities 
while contributing to poverty alleviation (André, 2014) through “Base of the Pyramid” (BoP) 
strategies (Prahalad & Fruehauf, 2004) or social business ventures (Yunus, 2008). In the 
meantime, relatively new actors such as social enterprises (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011; 
Mair & Marti, 2006; Seelos & Mair, 2005) and microfinance organizations (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Bédécarrats, 2013) have taken the lion’s share among academia. Despite the 
diversity of these ventures that adopt practices from both for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, 
they all require financial resources to start-up, grow, and go to scale. However, small and 
medium-sized entrepreneurs in developing countries’ economies have little access to finance 
and fall in the “Missing Middle” (Kauffmann, 2005). Their access to formal finance is poor as 
they rarely meet conditions set by formal financial institutions and are also, generally, too 
large for microfinance organizations. They find their main sources of capital in their retained 
earnings and informal savings which are often not secured and have little scope for risk-
sharing.  
A new class of social finance actors has emerged in order to answer the specific needs of 
social innovation ventures (Moore, Westley, & Nicholls, 2012). Social enterprises are no 
longer solely tied to grants and contracts from government agencies or foundations as 
primary sources of financial support. In between the traditional philanthropy and mainstream 
investing, “social investments” are pursuing a blended value creation “that combines both an 
attention to financial return and a focus on social/environmental outputs or outcomes” 
(Nicholls, 2010, p. 76). Among the different terminologies covered by social investments, 
impact investing emerges as a “powerful and promising opportunity for social enterprises that 
are currently undercapitalized, as well as a boost to economic development committed to 
social and environmental sustainability around the world” (Mendell & Barbosa, 2013, p. 2).  
Impact investing 
Impact investing is a nascent industry which has not yet attracted much scholar study. A first 
academic review performed by Höchstädter and Scheck (2014) highlights the absence of a 
uniform definition and a clear understanding. Nevertheless, a high level of agreement 
anchors impact investing around “two core elements: non-financial impact, typically in the 
form of social and/or environmental impact, and financial return, which requires at least the 
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preservation of the invested principal but can allow for market-beating returns” (Höchstädter 
& Scheck, 2014, p. 12). It is noteworthy that non-financial impact – i.e. societal impact – is 
meant to be intentional, that is to say, not an incidental side-effect of an investment. On the 
debate about the balance between financial and societal returns, the strategy of impact 
investors are considered to be at their own discretion, while a segmentation could classify 
them as finance-first or impact-first investors (Freireich & Fulton, 2009, p. 31; Joy, de Las 
Casas, & Rickey, 2011, p. 11). In that sense, impact investing differs from – or “goes beyond” 
– Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) by the fact that it is more proactive to solve social or 
environmental stakes, and that it primarily targets small and medium enterprises that are not 
publicly listed (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). 
Impact investors are quite diverse and can range from Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs), foundations, or diversified financial organizations and banks (Saltuk et al., 2014). 
Recently, MNEs have launched their own impact investing fund, adopting a corporate 
venture capital approach in order to support the development of innovative social 
enterprises. Asset classes and financial instruments mobilized by investors appear to be 
diverse, with a predominance of debt, equity, guarantees, and deposits (Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2014). Impact investments will focus on ventures, mostly in emerging or developing 
countries, active in a wide range of sectors including agriculture, clean technology and 
energy, education, healthcare, financial services and microfinance, housing, or water. These 
investees appear to be predominantly in a post-venture stage (i.e. growth or mature stage), 
therefore testifying for a proven track record that shall limit the risks for their investors (Saltuk 
et al., 2014).  
The objective of delivering societal impact from such investments appears critical for 
accountability. Impact investors require their investees to track and measure this new type of 
value creation at the operational level. However, an often cited and important limitation of the 
industry lies in the fact that there is a “lack of internationally agreed accounting standards for 
such capital flows” (Nicholls, 2010, p. 93). 
Measuring impact performance 
Social impact measurement has gained interest among social innovation practitioners. Social 
enterprises are specifically questioned on this topic to update their boards of directors in the 
achievement of their social mission, to appease their investors willing to control the use of 
the funds, or to guide their management team concerned by improving their activities 
(Stievenart & Pache, 2014). Despite the proliferation of hundreds of competing methods for 
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calculating social value2, social enterprises struggle to put them into practice (Mulgan, 2010). 
The concept of impact monitoring and evaluation primarily emanates from development aid 
in humanitarian and public sectors. The term “impact” is defined as the “Positive and 
negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, 
directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (OECD, 2002, p. 24). More recently, social 
impact evaluations have regained interest through the promotion of experimental techniques 
such as randomized control trials (RCTs) (Duflo & Kremer, 2003). However, such impact 
evaluations are expensive in nature, and require significant time and skilled human 
resources to be implemented. As such they appear to be unbearable by social enterprises 
(Hulme, 2000), or even incompatible with a business mindset. Some authors rather advocate 
for the development of on-going performance monitoring approaches aimed at understanding 
the induced social changes through quantitative approaches. In this line of thought, Mair and 
Marti (2006, p. 42) urge “to develop useful and meaningful measures that capture the impact 
of social entrepreneurship and reflect the objectives pursued.” 
Coming back to impact investing, the industry is also developing new impact measurement 
systems. The aim is to improve the reporting’s transparency of social investees’ 
performance, to enhance fund’s accountability towards their stakeholders, and to make 
better capital allocation decisions (Antadze & Westley, 2012). Impact investors are therefore 
adopting emerging approaches such as rating systems (e.g. Global Impact Investing Rating 
Systems, GIIRS), certification or assessment systems (e.g. BCorp) or performance 
management systems (e.g. Impact Reporting & Investment Standard, IRIS) (Mendell & 
Barbosa, 2013; Olsen & Galimidi, 2008). The agreement on standardized performance 
impact metrics has been reported by practitioners as an important factor to develop the 
impact investing industry (Saltuk et al., 2014). As such, the Global Impact Investing Network 
(GIIN), a not-for-profit organization dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness of the 
impact investing industry, promoted the use of the IRIS database. IRIS is defined as a 
“catalog of generally-accepted performance metrics” (GIIN, 2015). It describes short to mid-
term societal “outputs” or “outcomes” rather than long-term social “impact” in different sectors 
of activities. In that sense, Geobey, Westley, and Weber (2012) argue that building such 
meaningful and multidimensional measures represents an incremental innovation for 
investors while still having the potential to create transformative outcomes. The survey of 
Saltuk et al. (2014) on 125 impact investing funds reports for a large adoption of IRIS, 
promising the tool to become a standard (Bouri, 2011), aligned with the business-oriented 
practices of the industry. 
                                               
2 See further the TRASI database, which references close to 200 approaches to social impact 
assessment. http://trasi.foundationcenter.org/ 
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Adopting a double financial and societal objective require impact investors to develop new 
societal performance methodologies as a mean to build their accountability towards their 
stakeholders, while not hindering financial returns. The following part provides a theoretical 
perspective on the way such actors surface conflicts and compatibilities among these two 
different institutional logics. 
2.2. Institutional and resource dependence perspectives on pressures 
Hybrid institutions and organizations 
Institutional theory argues that relationships among organizations and the fields in which they 
operate are influenced by their institutional environment. An institution can be defined as 
“relatively widely diffused practices, technologies, or rules that have become entrenched in 
the sense that it is costly to choose other practices, technologies, or rules” (Lawrence, Hardy, 
& Nelson, 2002, p. 282). The act of integrating taken-for-granted institutional logics will in 
turn protect the organization from having its conduct questioned. This would help 
organizations gain legitimacy, that is the recognition of a socially desirable, proper, or 
appropriate status (Suchman, 1995). Multiple institutional logics might influence 
organizations simultaneously (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). These multiple logics can co-exist 
and sometimes compete, leading to complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & 
Lounsbury, 2011). Competing institutional logics tend to lead to arrangements between firms 
to ensure their operations (Tan & Wang, 2011; Westermann-Behaylo, Berman, & Van Buren, 
2014).  Co-existing logics might also give birth to a new hybrid version of the previous 
dominant logics (Arjalies, 2013; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). 
A “hybrid” organization is an organization that embodies multiple institutional logics. 
Recently, researchers mobilized an institutional perspective to examine social innovation 
(Dacin et al., 2011). Several scholars describe social enterprises as hybrid organizations in 
the sense that they combine social welfare and commercial logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Battilana and Dorado (2010) 
describe specifically microfinance organizations as hybrid entities that “combined two 
previously separated ‘logics’: a development logic that guided their mission to help the poor, 
and a banking logic that required profits sufficient to support ongoing operations and fulfill 
fiduciary obligations.” Most of the cited authors describe the simultaneous combination of 
conflicting logics. Developing collaborative relationships helps to manage the rivalry between 
these competing logics (Reay & Hinings, 2009) and lead to the creation of new institutions 
(Lawrence et al., 2002). 
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Pertaining to our organizational field, we argue that impact investing funds are hybrid 
organizations, similarly combining a development logic and an investment logic. While the 
impact investing industry has been structured from a predominantly investing institution, its 
proponents such as the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) strongly advocate for its 
societal purpose through common beliefs and strategy (O’Donohoe et al., 2010). This 
professional association further promotes the adoption of societal performance monitoring 
tools such as the IRIS catalog of impact metrics (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). Mobilizing 
neo-institutional theory, Nicholls (2010)  highlights the multiple, contradictory, or ambiguous 
institutional norms and pressures that different types of social investors are facing. However, 
the author does not further detail how social finance actors manage their position in between 
a financial- and a societal-maximization perspective. 
Theoretical perspectives on responses to pressures 
Institutional theory focuses on the external logics being exerted on the organization. Earlier 
neo-institutional theorists emphasize the coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures of an 
institution that shapes somewhat predictable business practices. Such pressures to conform 
to norms could be overcome by organizations through decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
When decoupling, firms give only ceremonial or symbolical commitment to institutional 
pressures without adopting their required practices. This permits organizations to keep their 
values and beliefs unchanged. More recently, studies attempted to predict the responses of 
organizations facing multiple conflicting logics (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Studies focusing on 
the social innovation field such as microfinance organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), 
social enterprises (Tracey et al., 2011), or social integration enterprises (Pache & Santos, 
2013) highlight a combination or an adoption of both intact logics rather than decoupling. 
According to Battilana and Dorado (2010), having no prior experience with a logic would be a 
prerequisite in an organization for blended hybridization. 
In parallel, resource dependence theory (RDT) rather suggests that the influence of these 
pressures are also linked to  the control that its proponents have over the resources of the 
organization (Greenwood et al., 2011). This line of thought is based on the notion that “all 
organizations critically depend on other organizations for the provision of vital resources, and 
that this dependence is often reciprocal” (Drees & Heugens, 2013, p. 1667). Recent writings 
have also highlighted that passive conformity to rules and standards might have been 
exaggerated and that factors such as agency, choice, proactiveness and self-interest can 
lead to a variety of responses to institutional pressures (Jamali, 2010; Oliver, 1991; Tan & 
Wang, 2011). In their meta-analysis of 157 articles on RDT, Drees and Heugens (2013) 
validate the theory that was initially formulated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978): organizations 
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respond to resource dependencies from external actors by forming inter-organizational 
arrangements, which in turn strengthen the organization’s autonomy and legitimacy. 
Research on hybrid organizations has not devoted much attention to a resource dependence 
perspective and the associated arrangements that such actors could develop. 
Therefore our article aims at addressing impact investing as hybrid organizations through a 
neo-institutional and a resource dependence theory perspective. We further propose to study 
the responses of such hybrid organizations that primarily rely on an investment logic while 
integrating a development logic to pursue their societal purpose. 
2.3. Theoretical framework: Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
Five strategic responses 
Drawing on resource dependence and institutional arguments, Oliver (1991) proposes a 
detailed typology of strategic responses available for organizations facing institutional 
pressures. These include Acquiescence, Compromise, Avoidance, Defiance and 
Manipulation. Figure 1 sorts these strategic responses from passive conformity to proactive 
resistance. 
 
Passive  
Conformity 
   Active 
 Resistance 
       
 Acquiescence Compromise Avoidance Defiance Manipulation  
 Habit Balance Conceal Dismiss Co-opt  
 Imitate Pacify Buffer Challenge Influence  
 Comply Bargain Escape Attack Control  
 
Figure 1: Repertoire of responses to institutional pressures (adapted from Jamali, 2010) 
 
The most passive response, acquiescence, refers to the adoption of institutional logics and 
values. Such a response will be pursued through the habit of taken-for-granted norms, the 
imitation of institutional models, or the compliance to institutional requirements. 
Compromise refers to a partial conformity with institutional requirements. Organizations will 
balance the multiple expectations through negotiation, pacify some of the institutional 
pressures, or bargain demands from institutional stakeholders. Avoidance refers to the 
attempt by organizations to preclude the necessity of conformity or to circumvent the 
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conditions that make this conformity necessary. Organizations will try to conceal their 
nonconformity, buffer themselves from institutional pressures, or simply escape institutional 
rules and expectations. A more active response, Defiance, refers to an explicit rejection of at 
least one of the institutional pressures. Organizations achieve this by dismissing or ignoring 
specific institutional logics, by challenging the rules and requirements, or by explicitly 
attacking or denouncing the institutional values and its promoters. Finally, manipulation 
refers to the most active attempt to change or exert power over the requirements that the 
institutions express and enforce. Manipulation tactics include co-opting the source of the 
pressures, influencing the definition of the norms through lobbying, or even controlling the 
organizations that are the sources of the pressure. 
Five institutional antecedents  
In order to characterize the institutional contexts and conditions under which organizations 
will embrace or resist institutionalizations, Oliver (1991) outlined five antecedents. These 
predictive dimensions include the Cause, Constituents, Content, Control and Context of the 
institutional pressures. Table 1 illustrates the degree of each of these institutional 
antecedents as a prediction of strategic responses adopted by organizations. 
 
Table 1: Institutional antecedents and predicted strategic responses (adapted from Oliver, 1991) 
Predictive Factor Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause      
Legitimacy H L L L L 
Efficiency H L L L L 
Constituents      
Multiplicity L H H H H 
Dependence H H M L L 
Content      
Consistency H M M L L 
Constraint L M H H H 
Control      
Coercion H M M L L 
Diffusion H H M L L 
Context      
Uncertainty H H H L L 
Inter-connectedness H H M L L 
L = Low, M = Moderate, H = High 
Cause of institutional pressures typically answers why they are being exerted. It studies the 
rationale or intended adequacy of the organization with a social legitimacy and an economic 
efficiency. Institutional constituents identify who is exerting the pressures. It examines the 
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multiplicity of the actors imposing the pressures as well as the dependency of the 
organization on them. The content captures what these pressures are. It considers the 
consistency of the pressures with the organizational goals and the discretionary constraints 
imposed on the organization. Control clarifies how or by what means pressures are exerted. 
It looks at both the legal enforcement and the voluntary diffusion of norms. Finally, the 
institutional context explains where the pressures occur. It explores the uncertainty and the 
interconnectedness of the environmental context within which institutional pressures are 
exerted. 
Pache and Santos (2010) mobilize Oliver’s typology of strategic responses to study 
institutional pressures that are exerted upon hybrid organizations. However their study does 
not carefully track the variations in the ten dimensions of Oliver’s antecedents. They argue 
that the predictive power of Oliver’s model is quite low when it comes to specifying 
responses to conflicting institutional logics exerted on the hybrid organization (Pache & 
Santos, 2010). We aim at opening the discussion one stage further. Our paper considers that 
the co-existing logics faced by impact investing funds are no longer necessarily antagonists. 
Relying on Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 352), the objective of our study is a first step to “learn 
whether organizations experiencing enduring and stable institutional complexity develop 
blended hybrid arrangements that, over time, become institutionalized within the organization 
and thus uncontested ‘settlements’.” In other words, we aim at understanding how emerging 
impact investing funds are managing their shared value creation by balancing financial and 
societal performance requirements. 
3. RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1. The case of Energy Access Ventures Fund 
Schneider Electric Access to Energy program 
This case focuses on an impact investing fund that emanates from Schneider Electric, a 
leading French multinational enterprise in energy management. The company evolved to 
position itself as a solution provider for utilities and infrastructures, industries and machine 
manufacturers, non-residential buildings, data centers and networks, and the residential 
sector. The company employs more than 150 000 people worldwide, reaching a turnover of 
24 billion Euros in 2013, for which developing economies represented 43%. Inscribed in the 
company’s strategy, the Sustainable Development direction initiated an Access to Energy 
program in 2009 (André & Ponssard, 2015). This “Base of the Pyramid” (BoP) initiative aims 
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at promoting access to energy for low-income populations in Africa, India and South-East 
Asia (Vermot Desroches & André, 2012). The Access to Energy program combines three 
business and philanthropic approaches: 
· An impact investing fund, Schneider Electric Energy Access (SEEA), financially 
supports the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the field of 
access to energy and job integration; 
· An offer creation team develops a specific portfolio of products and solutions. A 
business development team deploys them to commercially meet the means and 
needs of BoP populations that lack access to modern energy; 
· A training team sponsors the creation of vocational training, through the financial 
support of the company’s Foundation, in order to develop long-term regional 
competencies in electricity trades. 
Since its launch, the Access to Energy program testifies for having invested in twelve SMEs; 
provided energy to more than 2.3 million households; and created almost 40 training 
programs in energy management reaching more than 62,000 people (Schneider Electric, 
2015a). 
Energy Access Ventures Fund 
In late 2011, Schneider Electric capitalized on its experience with the SEEA fund to initiate 
the creation of a second bigger impact investing fund, called Energy Access Ventures Fund 
(EAVF). EAVF stipulates in its legal document that it has “a unique positioning” in the energy 
sector: “between Traditional pure private equity funds, targeting high investment returns and 
mainly investing in emerging markets; and Venture philanthropists and foundations, 
prioritizing social impact over financial return” (EAVF, 2015, p. 3). It further positions itself as 
a hybrid organization and defines itself as being “an impact private equity fund with a double 
objective: (i) generate a financial return for its investors between 6% and 10% net of 
management fees and (ii) complete investments with a measurable social impact on local 
communities” (EAVF, 2015, p. 3).  
While SEEA cumulated total assets of € 4 million and invested in 12 companies in late 2014, 
EAVF succeeded in aggregating a total of € 54.5 million at the date of its closing in early 
2015 (Schneider Electric, 2015b). Schneider Electric – the sponsor company – invested 30% 
of the total assets of EAVF alongside four Development Finance Institutions (DFIs): the UK’s 
CDC Group (30%), the European Investment Bank (EIB – 18%), the French Global 
Environment Facility (FFEM) and PROPARCO (12%), and the OPEC Fund for International 
Development (OFID – 9%). EAVF is composed of three entities: the Energy Access Fund 
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that receives the capitalization, its management company Aster Capital Partners, a portfolio 
management company specialized in private equity, and the advisory company Energy 
Access Ventures, in charge of the screening, the due diligence, the monitoring and the exit of 
investments. Figure 2 depicts the organizational structure of EAVF at the date of its closing in 
February 2015. 
 
 
Figure 2: Organizational structure of EAVF as of February 2015 
 
The strategy of EAVF can be described following the framework for impact investors 
provided by Höchstädter and Scheck (2014). On the demography and geography 
dimensions, the fund will focus on ventures targeting low-income (i.e. BoP) populations in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The fund will start “in East Africa before expanding to other African 
countries” (EAVF, 2015, p. 3). On the organizational processes dimension, the fund 
intends to create economic and societal value for the beneficiaries through the investees’ 
business operations. The sector dimension of the fund is primarily addressing off-grid rural 
electrification. Targeted ventures will be involved in manufacturing, distributing, selling, 
renting, installing, maintaining, financing or owning power generation systems, micro-
generation infrastructures, “energy kiosks”, fleet of batteries, or any other activities linked to 
electricity. On the impact objective dimension, EAVF clearly “plans to provide reliable 
electricity access to at least 1,000,000 low-income beneficiaries, in rural and peri-urban 
Managing Societal Performance of Impact Investing   
André, T.  15/37 
areas” (EAVF, 2015, p. 3). On the financial and organizational structure dimension of the 
recipients of the investments, the fund will primarily target non-listed small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs) that are recognized as falling in the “missing middle”, lacking access to 
traditional finance. Finally, on the asset classes and financial instruments dimensions, 
EAVF will “mainly invest in equity, quasi-equity or, to a lesser extent, long term debt 
instruments” (EAVF, 2015, p. 4). EAVF intends to be a minority shareholder investing up to 
33% in the investees with investments ranging from € 500K up to € 4,000K per company. 
EAVF undergoes both an institutional pressure, combining societal and profitability 
performance requirements due to its status of impact investing fund, and a resource 
dependency with its own investors, namely Schneider Electric and the four DFIs. The later 
imposed requirements on EAVF to develop procedures and tools to specifically manage its 
developmental impact. 
Societal Management Procedure of EAVF 
EAVF developed a triple bottom line accountability procedure in order to better understand 
the changes and impacts related to its interventions towards its portfolio companies and their 
environment. This Societal Management Procedure (SMP) is composed of two parallel 
methodologies as depicted in Figure 3. First, an Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) management system aims at assessing and mitigating risks. Secondly, an Impact 
Performance Monitoring (IPM) system aims at understanding, capturing, and improving the 
social and environmental value creation of the investees’ activities. Those two parallel 
approaches, embedded in every steps of the investment procedure, lead to the definition of 
specific technical assistance provided to the portfolio companies. The DFIs which invested in 
EAVF also committed an additional € 2.4 million to support technical assistance. 
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Figure 3: Societal Management Procedure (SMP) of EAVF 
 
Screening Environmental, Social and Governance criteria has been popularized by the 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) industry. EAVF adopted the CDC Group toolkit for 
fund managers (CDC Group, 2010), which is recognized as a reference standard for 
investment funds active in developing countries. ESG management systems review each 
investees’ social criteria (e.g. working conditions, H&R management, impact on local 
communities), environmental criteria (e.g. visual impacts and noise, waste and effluents, air 
emissions, energy efficiency, water consumption), and governance-related criteria (e.g. 
business integrity and good corporate governance). 
As for the Impact Performance Monitoring system, the fund had to develop its own 
methodology as no explicit tools were available neither in the impact investing industry nor in 
the energy access sector. The requirement to adopt a societal management procedure 
implies that the EAVF team must dedicate a significant amount of time in assessing, 
reviewing, and reporting the societal performance of its investments. Meanwhile, the EAVF 
team raised some operational limitation concerns based on their previous experience in 
impact investing. All those aspects were negotiated with their investors prior to the final 
closing of the fund and is presented in the case study. 
3.2. Action Research and case study methodology 
The research question of how an impact investing fund is building its accountability and 
societal legitimacy towards its stakeholders originates from a doctoral collaboration with 
Schneider Electric. In September 2011, the author initiated an applied research with the 
Sustainable Development direction, which focused on the company’s concern about 
managing extra-financial benefits of its “Base of the Pyramid” initiative. At that time, the 
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Access to Energy program was already running the SEEA fund. A few months later, the 
company took the decision to build a second external impact investing fund that would 
become EAVF. The research collaboration permitted to the author to share his time with the 
team and thus develop an “insider” position (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007). In that sense, I 
benefited from an “active member” status and assumed “a functional role in addition to the 
observational role” (Adler & Adler, 1987). My position facilitated building “trust and 
acceptance of the researcher” (Adler & Adler, 1987) and gave me the ability to get into the 
organizational system, to take part in the meetings, and to influence decisions related to the 
research partnership. A governance mechanism aimed at avoiding a potential interpretation 
bias related to the insider position of the researcher, who is said to have an underlying social, 
economic, or even ideological motivation. Twice a year, a steering committee of the research 
partnership was permitted to review the progress of the research, to discuss its learning, to 
adapt research activities, and to validate the next steps. 
On the methodological side, the paper is grounded in an action-research. A common 
definition has been provided by Rapoport (1970): “Action research aims to contribute both to 
the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of 
science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable framework” (p. 499). As a 
researcher, the author contributed to generating the phenomenon that is intended to be 
analyzed through his research activities. The action-research collaboration with the 
Sustainable Development direction followed the cyclical process described by Susman and 
Evered (1978). The cycle was aimed at understanding and defining the answer to pressures 
of adopting societal management procedures of the new impact investing fund. It started in 
January 2013 and lasted two years until the closing of the fund. Figure 4 depicts the cyclical 
process of the action-research. 
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Figure 4: cyclical process of action-research 
 
The cyclical process of the action-research started with the understanding of the need for a 
new impact investing fund to integrate a Societal Management Procedure within its 
investment procedure. This preliminary question rose with the anticipated requirements from 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) that could become the co-investors of the fund 
alongside Schneider Electric. A review of the stakes for an impact investing fund to manage 
its societal value creation highlighted the requirement to adopt an ESG management system 
and to develop a specific Impact Performance Monitoring (IPM) system related to the mission 
and the sector of the fund. The IPM tool would permit the investment managers to estimate 
ex-ante the societal benefits of a potential investee, to track the fund’s societal performance 
from its actual investment until the exit and to report to their own investors and community at 
large. Once the IPM tool had been designed, a first experimentation was conducted with one 
of the portfolio companies of the first fund, active in Uganda. Based on the theoretical 
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methodology and the learning of the experimentation, the fund managers presented the 
overall procedure to its potential investors. Negotiations started from this point in order to 
take into account the requirements of the funds’ potential investors while remaining 
operationally pragmatic for the future managers of EAVF and for its investees. 
The remaining of the paper is built on an in-depth case study methodology (Eisenhardt  & 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) that focuses on the perceived antecedents from EAVF on the 
strategic responses to the institutional pressures to conform to societal performance 
management. The case study is exploratory (Yin, 2009). Hypotheses and data were either 
directly obtained or created through exchanges with the client system (Susman & Evered, 
1978). Throughout the different phases of action-research, methods of data collection 
included the study of internal documents, the production of research notes and 
presentations, and the development of EAVF procedures. An important time was dedicated 
to informal exchanges with members of both the Sustainable Development direction and the 
EAVF future team and for which minutes were written down in a research logbook. The 
methodology also relies on participatory and deliberative meetings gathering members of 
both the internal and external client system. Each meeting’s purpose was structured and 
submitted ex-ante to participants and the discussions were synthesized and collegially 
shared ex-post. These notes aimed at generating knowledge with the client system, 
especially during the negotiation phase. Finally, five semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with managers or directors related to EAVF, which allowed for the completion of 
the analysis based on Oliver’s framework. The semi-structured questionnaire is depicted in 
Appendix. A literal transcription of the recorded interviews permitted a consistent use of the 
data.  
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The following part describes the managerial perceptions of institutional antecedents of 
adopting a Societal Management Procedure. All participants of this research adhered to a 
combination of adopting an existing ESG management system from the CDC group and 
developing a specific Impact Performance Monitoring system mainly based on the IRIS 
catalog of indicators. Table 2 summarizes the characterization of each of the five 
antecedents and their predictive factors.  
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Table 2: EAVF Managerial perceptions (in bold italics) of institutional antecedents of SMP 
Predictive Factor Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause      
Legitimacy H L L L L 
Efficiency H L L L L 
Constituents      
Multiplicity L H H H H 
Dependence H H M L L 
Content      
Consistency H M M L L 
Constraint L M H H H 
Control      
Coercion H M M L L 
Diffusion H H M L L 
Context      
Uncertainty H H H L L 
Inter-connectedness H H M L L 
L = Low, M = Moderate, H = High 
4.1. Perceptions of cause: legitimacy and efficiency 
Legitimacy – The participation of EAVF in a Societal Management Procedure seems mostly 
and primarily driven by salient legitimacy. Directly linked with its inner societal mission, a 
respondent stipulates that “The fund has been created to get an impact” and that it is “clearly 
for this reason that DFIs came as co-investors”. Tracking, reporting and improving its societal 
impact aim at validating the fund’s societal objective and at promoting its credibility. In the 
words of one of the managers interviewed, “alignment with this procedure first helps us to 
make sure that our investees have a positive impact. Then we can report to our own 
investors that are quite cautious about the developmental role of their assets.” Another 
participant stipulates that “this procedure will help us to objectify our capacity to deliver 
societal returns.” Reputation, status, or image has not been stated as a primary concern for 
EAVF managers. However it is noteworthy that at the origin of this project, Schneider Electric 
– the sponsor of the fund – inscribed EAVF in the continuity of its CSR strategy and its 
existing Access to Energy program. In that sense, an investment manager recognized that 
“this impact investing fund has been identified by Schneider as an innovative tool to 
contribute to the development of populations and to position itself as a leading actor in the 
energy access space”. 
Efficiency – The majority of the interviewees questioned the explicit contribution of the SMP 
to economic gains or economic rationalization. While they have no track record yet to testify 
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for such economic benefits for the investees – and therefore the fund – we might notice two 
possibilities. On the one hand, societal management systems might imply serious costs and 
time for the portfolio companies in the short term. One manager stipulates “These are 
complex procedures that could affect negatively the profitability of the ventures.” On the other 
hand, portfolio companies could benefit from the SMP reports in the midterm, provided that 
they testify for a positive societal value creation. In that sense, one of the participants 
highlights that “access to specific developmental funding, grants or preferred loans will 
inherently contribute to the financial strength of the portfolio companies”. Similarly, managing 
and mitigating ESG risks is acknowledged by most of the interviewees to increase the 
economic stability of the ventures in the long-term.  
It is thus fair to characterize the perceptions of these institutional antecedents as high in 
relation to legitimacy and low in relation to efficiency as illustrated in Table 2.  
4.2. Perceptions of constituents: multiplicity and dependence 
Multiplicity – The actors requiring for the fund to adopt a Societal Management Procedure 
remain relatively limited to the Development Finance Institutions that invested in it. One of 
the investment managers stipulates, “At the beginning there was a common aspiration 
between the DFIs to focus on social impact criteria rather than on the financial return.” While 
there is no standard for ESG management systems, one of the DFIs suggested using its own 
toolkit, which diminished the multiplicity of demands from the others. In regards to the Impact 
Performance Monitoring, the proposal to use the emerging standardized indicators from the 
IRIS catalog has been well received by the fund’s investors. However, most of the 
interviewees insisted on the diversified requirements in monitoring specific indicators from 
one DFI to another during the negotiation phase of the final Societal Management 
Procedure. Such a multiplicity on the number of compulsory indicators to report to each DFI 
presented some conflicting expectations in some of the domains of impacts that had to be 
measured. One of the participants states that “Every DFI has its own societal impact 
measures and indicators.” He explains further that “There has been a huge work to 
harmonize each of their requirements and at the end, the reporting is quite heavy.” 
Dependence – It is clear that EAVF dependency to adopt a Societal Management Procedure 
is fundamental. The creation of a SMP that would meet the requirements of the DFIs 
appeared as a prerequisite to get their approval to invest in the fund. While there were no 
alternative solutions to complying with the DFIs requirements, this does not mean that EAVF 
team members did not discussed the final SMP. However, one manager admits, "we were in 
a process in which our capacity to negotiate was limited by our own willingness to close this 
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fund.” Another participant states further, “Time will tell us if we solely must comply with the 
demands of the DFIs or if we can resist”. Nonetheless, the use of a sufficiently robust ESG 
management tool and standardized IRIS indicators is acknowledged by EAVF members as 
being an advantage in terms of legitimacy for future external certification and rating. 
Accordingly, the respective perceptions of these institutional antecedents are characterized 
as low in relation to multiplicity and high in relation to dependence as depicted in Table 2.  
4.3. Perceptions of content: consistency and constraints 
Consistency – All the interviewees considered a Societal Management Procedure to be very 
consistent with the fund’s impact mission. Most of them posited that conformity to this 
demand was a natural extension given the fund’s social aspirations. The SMP is fully 
integrated in every step of the investment procedure, from the initial screening to the exit 
strategy through the due-diligence phase and the post-investment monitoring. Moreover, the 
participants acknowledge the consistency of a great majority of the IPM tool indicators with 
the business activity of their future investees. However, fund’s managers considered that 
some of the requirements of the DFIs would lead to an encumbering procedure. As a 
consequence, societal performance monitoring could become counter-productive for the 
investees and potentially hinder their business development activities. One manager 
characterized it in these terms, “We don’t want a venture to be drowning in demands it might 
consider absurd. As an example, asking a company to track the incomes of each of its 
customers might be typically infeasible or even ethically inappropriate.” This is also why the 
SMP focuses on impact performance indicators up to the outcomes that can be directly 
measured by the investees rather than evaluating the long-term social impacts per se.  
Constraints – Negotiations took place when EAVF team and its investors had to agree on 
the final Societal Management Procedure to adopt. The relatively standard ESG 
management system that was chosen appeared to be easily incorporated in the fund’s 
activities. On the contrary, the Impact Monitoring Performance system had to be created. 
Discussions during the negotiation phase mostly focused on it. The fund managers agreed 
with their investors on a compulsory list of key performance indicators that would be 
assessed periodically for every portfolio company. However, it was agrees that more 
complex reporting requirements specific to each DFIs would remain at the discretion of the 
fund managers on a bilateral basis. EAVF team also managed to leave the financial and 
operational responsibility of thorough social impact studies to the DFIs, should they be willing 
to get more accurate long-term evaluations. As an illustration, one of the interviewee states: 
“We are impact investors. We invest in business ventures whose job is not to conduct 
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extensive sociological surveys on each of their customers”. Another participant explains that 
“the fund will not be accountable for social impact evaluations. The fund will rather provide an 
opened analysis field for the DFIs”. 
Based on patterns of responses obtained, it is thus possible to characterize the perceptions 
of these institutional antecedents as moderate in relation to both consistency and constraints 
as illustrated in Table 2.  
4.4. Perceptions of control: coercion and diffusion 
Coercion – The compliance to the Societal Management Procedure, agreed during 
negotiations, is legally enforced through the contract signed between EAVF and its investors. 
EAVF team intends to apply and be accountable towards the DFIs for the overall application 
of the SMP within its day to day investment procedure. In the short to mid-term, the fund has 
an obligation of means in executing the SMP. It involves reporting on the activities of the 
investees and the fund respectively on a quarterly and an annual basis. In the long-term, the 
fund also has an obligation of outcomes, related to its both objectives of financial and 
societal returns. Not respecting those two obligations might be a reason for the DFIs to stop 
their periodic disbursements in EAVF when they would require additional assets to invest in 
new companies. One of the fund’s managers compares the SMP as a “governance tool with 
all the means of pressures that goes with it, including potential sanctions for instance on our 
variable compensation.”  
Diffusion – While the diversity of methodologies in both ESG and IPM remains relatively 
low, no regulations require impact investing funds to adopt specific practices. Nonetheless, 
ESG systems are acknowledged to be diffused in the similar Socially Responsible 
Investment industry and tend to be applied in the impact investing one. Similarly, the IRIS 
catalog of indicators is considered as a potential standard. One of the participants highlighted 
that the “diffusion of standards remain relatively low, especially in the access to energy 
sector.” Dwelling further on the implementation of the SMP, he explains: “we will have to 
demonstrate its acceptability, we will have to diffuse our practices and by this way we will set 
a precedent which will serve as a reference for our industry.” It is also in that sense that the 
investment managers intend to certify their application of the Principles for Responsible 
Investments (PRI) on the ESG side of the SMP, or to be rated through the Global Impact 
Investing Rating Systems (GIIRS) on the IPM side of the Societal Management Procedure. 
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Therefore, we might characterize the perceptions of these institutional antecedents 
respectively as high in relation to coercion and as moderate in relation to diffusion as 
depicted in Table 2.  
4.5. Perceptions of context: uncertainty and interconnectedness 
Uncertainty – The emerging procedures and standard indicators for both the ESG and IPM 
systems are acknowledged by the fund’s managers as being relatively stable. Most of the 
concerns about the uncertainty of the overall Societal Management Procedure remain on the 
IRIS catalog of indicators promoted by the GIIN. At the time of the final adoption of specific 
indicators within the IPM system, the IRIS catalog was in its third version. Most of the chosen 
indicators were slightly modified compared to previous versions of IRIS. One manager states 
that “the methodology today is not a standard but if it has to evolve it will never be a 
reconfiguration of our way of thinking.”  
Interconnectedness – Inter-connectedness is a salient aspect for the context of the overall 
Societal Management Procedure of the fund. First, EAVF will always co-invest with other 
impact investors as defined by its investment rules. This will require aligning its societal 
management procedure with other funds that are also seeking to mitigate ESG risks and 
improve the societal performance of their investments. Second, EAVF team will have 
periodic exchange on the SMP with its investors, and specifically the DFIs. Third, the 
participants acknowledge that the impact investing industry is still a rather small community 
of diverse actors that gather around the GIIN consortium. An investment manager highlights 
that the adoption of a relatively stringent and demanding procedure constitutes an advantage 
for anticipating its next evolutions. He further explains, “We will have the capacity to 
participate in the discussions and influence what will become a norm thanks to our deep 
experience in the energy access sector but also thanks to the legitimacy that we’ll get from 
complying to the high levels of requirements from the DFIs.” 
Accordingly, the respective perceptions of these institutional antecedents are characterized 
as low in relation to uncertainty and high in relation to interconnectedness as illustrated in 
Table 2. 
5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The research findings attempted to gauge managerial perceptions from EAVF team 
members to conform to a Societal Management Procedure as depicted in Table 2. Admitting 
that the qualitative answers to characterize each antecedent might be subjective, it was 
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nevertheless possible to detect rather low or high ranges based on the patterns of answers 
derived by the participants as well as on their precise rating of each dimension considered as 
low, moderate or high as illustrated in Appendix. Our research validates the theoretical 
framework of Oliver (1991) by challenging the central assumption of institutional theory that 
predicts passive conformity. They also complete the empirical work of Jamali (2010) by 
identifying empirical conditions under which pressures fail in their predicted effects.  
5.1. From acquiescence to compromise with investors 
Our case study reveals an evolution of EAVF strategic responses to institutional pressures, 
starting by acquiescing to conform to a societal management procedure and then trying to 
find a compromise. EAVF could not adopt any explicit standards that were neither shared 
within the impact investing industry nor agreed between the fund’s investors, namely the 
Development Finance Institutions. The findings rather suggest that acquiescence appeared 
first to EAVF as a natural strategic response to gain legitimacy. EAVF managers initially 
adopted a societal management procedure as a mean to conform to their own beliefs and 
values into their social mission (i.e. high legitimacy), to their investors’ expectations in terms 
of accountability (i.e. high coercion), and to the emerging practices of the impact investing 
industry through the IRIS indicators (i.e. low multiplicity).  
EAVF had to develop an Impact Performance Monitoring system aimed at tracking the 
changes induced by an investment. Adopting the logics of the development sector, the tool 
focuses on the inputs, activities, and outputs/outcomes – as defined by the OECD (2002). 
The IPM tool relies on a matrix of about a hundred key performance indicators gathered in a 
spreadsheet. Most of the indicators were chosen among the IRIS catalog as a mean to 
anticipate standardization and to facilitate reporting to the fund’s investors and stakeholders. 
Figure 5 synthesizes the IPM tool developed by EAVF team during its acquiescence phase 
to conform to a societal performance management procedure. Included into the fund’s overall 
investment procedure, the tool is first adapted to each portfolio company in order to better fit 
with the specificity of their activities. During the due-diligence process, a baseline 
assessment is performed to fill all the indicators. Then, an annual assessment of the 
investees’ activities reviews their main social outcomes related to the promotion of access to 
energy as a basis for development; economic outcomes in developing local economic 
activities; and environmental outcomes related to the mitigation of the impact of the company 
on the environment. 
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Figure 5: EAVF Impact Performance Monitoring tool 
 
In a second phase, EAVF searched for a compromise as a strategic response to the DFIs’ 
pressures. The negotiations that took place between the fund and its investors led to inter-
organizational arrangements focusing on the Impact Performance Monitoring (IPM) 
component of the SMP. The fund’s managers discussed the relative complexity of the 
procedure based on their first implementation. They considered it could hinder the business 
development activities of the portfolio companies, thus potentially limiting the capacity of the 
investees to generate profits (i.e. low efficiency). The complexity to run the procedure could 
also imply an arbitrage in the time conceded by the fund’s managers to support each of the 
investees (i.e. moderate consistency). The non-homogenous requirements from each DFI 
opened a space to negotiate what would be compulsory to report and at what periodicity (i.e. 
moderate constraint). 
The initial Impact Performance Monitoring tool has been well received by the DFIs. 
Nevertheless, each of them imposed new indicators related to their own reporting 
requirements. Moreover, while the initial IPM tool was meant to capture the generic impact 
performance, some of the DFIs required that indicators would be developed for every product 
that the company might offer to their end-customers. It was agreed that this would be 
performed only for the products the most sold to limit the complexity. As per the robustness 
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of the impact performance analysis, two DFIs imposed that baseline assumptions would be 
documented through ad hoc field surveys if the portfolio company could not provide 
justification. The EAVF team pinpointed the high cost of such studies, for which the DFIs 
accepted to bear the cost. Finally, an exact list of indicators was agreed to be compulsory 
reported, adding a quarterly tracking of a limited number of indicator. While EAVF managers 
acknowledged their dependence towards the DFIs that somehow limited their bargaining 
power, they recognize that such a demanding procedure could grant them greater legitimacy 
towards external rating and certifying bodies. Table 3 describes the evolution of the Impact 
Performance Monitoring system agreed after the negotiation phase with DFIs. 
Table 3: evolution of the IPM system after the compromise phase 
 
  
IPM tool 
- Generic indicators to track the overall 
results of the portfolio companies 
- Indicators disaggregated by main 
products commercialized by the 
portfolio companies 
- New indicators requested by DFIs  
(e.g. number of products returned for 
replacement, Levelized Cost of Energy, 
electricity capacity installed...) 
IPM system 
robustness 
- Estimation of the assumptions based on 
existing surveys and studies at the 
national or regional level 
- Documented proofs of the 
assumptions, based on ad hoc surveys 
conducted on investees’ target customers 
(borne by DFIs when not existing) 
(e.g. income profile of end-customers, 
GHG emissions replaced) 
IPM 
procedure 
1. Baseline assessment during due-
diligence 
2. Annual assessments 
1. Baseline assessment with documented 
assumptions during due-diligence 
2. Quarterly report to DFIs on 5 key 
performance indicators 
(e.g. number of products sold, number of 
new access, poverty level and settings of 
customers, number of products returned 
for replacement) 
3. Annual assessments 
5.2. A risk to avoid societal accountability 
Yet the findings also suggest that the contractual SMP procedure can blend in practice with 
different aspects of resistance – i.e. avoidance, defiance or manipulation. In a near future, 
there is a potential risk for EAVF managers to avoid the DFIs requirements, once they will 
have sufficient investments experience. As one of the managers stipulates, “Managing the 
societal performance of the fund requires a full time position that we cannot afford today. I 
believe that the reality of the field will impose us some shortcuts compared to an ideal 
Acquiescence phase Compromise phase 
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implementation of the SMP.” This could lead EAVF to adopt a symbolic conformity – or in 
other words to conduct decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) – by giving only ceremonial 
commitment to its societal performance monitoring and reporting requirements. The risk in 
such decoupling would be to impregnate the fund with a “social identity” in response to 
institutional pressures from its investors and its stakeholders at large. This would be 
comparable to a “green washing” attempt as pinpointed by Hamilton and Gioia (2009). 
Creating a “legitimacy façade” increases the risk to enable the institutionalization of 
misconduct and precipitate a loss of external legitimacy (MacLean & Behnam, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the inter-organizational arrangements will continue to be discussed throughout 
the fund’s lifetime due to the resource dependency with its investors. EAVF managers 
consider that the tradeoff between gaining legitimacy and keeping autonomy will be 
facilitated thanks to periodic discussions and renegotiations of the DFIs’ requirements. 
5.3. Balancing societal and financial management 
Finally, the research findings discuss the observation of incompatible institutional demands in 
social enterprises and hybrid organizations (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). We might indeed 
highlight a conflict – or a delicate balance – between profit and societal value creation 
objectives for the investment managers. Similar to the fund’s hybrid logic, portfolio 
companies have to deliver both societal results and financial profitability. The Societal 
Management Procedure integrated within the overall investment procedure of the fund 
consists in a novel form of practices meant to handle such tensions. One manager explains, 
“We will have to dedicate significant amounts of time and money to ventures that do not 
deliver societal impacts. But these resources will never be as high as the ones we will have 
to dedicate to ventures that ensure the fund to reach its financial objective. Generally 
speaking, the profits you made on one side can compensate the losses on the other.” In that 
sense, we could characterize EAVF managers as finance-first investors (Freireich & Fulton, 
2009). Such a concern highlights a potential tradeoff from EAVF managers to support their 
investees either on financial or societal value creation. Nonetheless, the fund’s managers 
recognize that they embed two logics that are potentially conflicting although not 
incompatible. As an illustration, one of the fund’s managers explains, “honestly today as an 
impact investor, I am considered as a capitalist when I am discussing with NGOs and as an 
activist when I am discussing with venture capitalists. But we are a new category of players 
that are capitalists-activists, or the opposite, it’s doesn’t matter. In fact, those are not 
contradictory opposites.” These findings reveal the actual development of “blended hybrid 
arrangements” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 352) within EAVF that can indeed face conflicting 
logics but not incompatible ones (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The paper considers impact investing as a research stream within the social innovation field. 
As hybrid organizations, impact investing funds face two dominant and co-existing 
institutional logics, namely an investment logic and a development logic. Prior theoretical 
work and empirical observations on this shared value creation objective are lacking for this 
nascent industry in particular, and for MNEs’ corporate responsibility in general. The paper 
therefore builds onto an action-research partnership with Schneider Electric and mobilizes 
strong primary empirical data through a case study of the creation of its Energy Access 
Ventures Fund. Traditional prejudices against case study methods rely on the limited ability 
to generalize the findings. We acknowledge that they are tied to the impact investing fund we 
studied. The single case study method however allowed us to explore the phenomenon in-
depth. It reveals the development of internal processes – taking the form of a fully integrated 
societal management procedure – that facilitates the balance between potentially conflicting 
logics that are no longer considered incompatible. 
We wanted to understand how impact investing funds are building their accountability and 
legitimacy, and more specifically how they are responding to their investor’s pressure to 
manage societal performance. The paper highlights the emergence of cycles of responses in 
a hybrid organization. The studied impact investing fund primarily consented to adopt 
emerging beliefs, values, norms and practices of its industry, motivated by a search for 
salient legitimacy. Building on the combination of institutional and resource dependence 
theory our findings provide empirical evidence for a more resistive answer to pressures 
beyond passive conformity. In a second phase, the fund’s team faced the complexity to 
manage societal performance based on first field experimentations and on an increased 
number of reporting requirements from its investors. They considered it could hinder both the 
business development activities of the portfolio companies and the overall capacity of EAVF 
to support them. As a consequence, the fund’s team searched for a compromise with its 
investors by negotiating a limited number of compulsory indicators to be reported periodically 
and an additional financial and skills support to conduct thorough impact evaluations. It is 
noteworthy that the fund’s resource dependence with its own investors has greatly influenced 
– not to say prevailed over – the design of its societal performance management and 
accountability. The findings suggest that the control systems set by the DFIs over the lifetime 
of the fund appear as a watchdog for EAVF to avoidance of societal performance 
management. 
The study of an impact investing fund during its creation phase helps us to draw some 
guidelines and recommendations for social innovation actors. 
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First, and generally speaking, any social innovation ventures are accountable for societal 
impact, and this has already become a trendy topic among practitioners. Our case study 
underlines the possibility to develop societal performance monitoring tools rather than long-
term impact evaluations. This type of approach is less costly and seems to better fit with 
business mindsets and routines of ventures targeting social issues. Adopting a performance-
oriented approach would also indirectly support the business development activities of the 
investees, thus limiting their risk profile. As an illustration, performing socio-economic 
customer surveys helps to better understand and answer to specific social contexts. In turn, 
the company will improve its marketing actions as a mean to simultaneously maximize its 
social impact and secure its financial returns. 
Second and more specifically pertaining to the impact investing industry, our case study calls 
for the emergence of standard metrics shared between social enterprises and impact 
investors. We further highlight that the practical monitoring of societal performance will be 
highly dependent on the expectations and requirements of the organization that will provide 
the resources to grow. Discussing and negotiating with its main financiers or stakeholders 
might therefore help aligning the organization’s reporting practices. This would decrease the 
entry-cost of monitoring societal performance and lower the work load required to report to 
their investors.  
Third, emerging economies’ governments and international development finance institutions 
have been asked since more than a decade to adopt result oriented approaches in 
documenting the impacts of their policies and investments. As such, the emerging practices 
of the impact investing industry highlighted in our case study demonstrate promising bridges 
between private and public sectors.  
Fourth, MNEs are increasingly involving towards the base of the economic pyramid as a 
continuation of their corporate responsibility. As such they are similarly struggling to balance 
societal and financial returns of their internal BoP initiatives. The processes illustrated in our 
case study provide some guidelines for MNEs to embed a performance-oriented 
measurement of societal value creation alongside financial one. Our case study of Schneider 
Electric and its impact investing fund highlights the opportunity for MNEs to infuse innovation 
internally by benchmarking business models that successfully balance societal and financial 
returns. Becoming an impact investor also helped the company to generate extra-financial 
returns such as image improvement by increasing its intimacy with Development Finance 
institutions. 
Finally, our paper provides some avenues for further exploration. We have highlighted the 
design and the adoption of societal performance monitoring tools and processes within 
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EAVF’s overall investment procedure. Further research might study their potential feedback 
effects on the combined objective of creating societal and financial value. A first step would 
be to look at the way EAVF or other impact investing funds have appropriated in time their 
societal management procedures, how they balance their search for legitimacy while keeping 
autonomy, and whether they have contributed to the evolution of the practices in the industry 
at large by communicating or interacting with their own investors, co-investors, and 
stakeholders. Similarly to what has been observed for the Socially Responsible Investing 
industry (Arjalies, 2013), we might question the risk for financial performance management to 
prevail over societal one. Secondly, and beyond managerial considerations, an important 
question remains on the capacity of these impact investing funds – and their portfolio 
companies – to actually generate simultaneously positive financial and societal returns. Such 
a condition would ensure impact investing to survive in time. Related to the Corporate Social 
Performance stream of research, organizational performance could be further studied, 
especially on the capacity of business models to create societal value, and on the potential 
trade-off between societal and financial returns. A starting point could focus on economics 
works studying the complementarities between the various components of societal 
responsibility and financial performance (Cavaco & Crifo, 2014). This would further enrich 
and discuss the findings of the first study performed by Evans (2013) on sixteen impact 
investors, which suggest that contracting strategies enable a strong financial performance 
without sacrificing impact. 
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire on institutional antecedents 
Introduction:  
We argue that impact investing is evolving in two types of “institutions”: an investing and a developmental institution, which both entail pressures to adopt 
specific values, beliefs, norms, rules and practices. 
Our research question is to examine “how an impact investing fund is responding to institutional pressures and more specifically to conform to a 
Societal Management Procedure (SMP)”. By SMP we refer to both the ESG management system and the Impact Performance Monitoring system. 
To answer this question we will scrutinize the “antecedents” of the pressure related to societal performance monitoring. Oliver’s (1991) framework describes 
5 antecedents: cause, constituents, content, control and context. 
You will be asked you to discuss / dwell on 10 of the antecedents’ dimensions and to characterize them as being low, moderate or high. 
Questionnaire: 
Cause 
“Cause” antecedent answers why the fund is being pressured to conform to societal management procedure rules or expectations. 
· Legitimacy         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
Implication of adherence to SMP for the fund's legitimacy, status, or image and prestige? for reputation and risk management in the short and long-term? 
· Efficiency          Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
Implication of adherence to SMP for the bottom line in the short and long-term? for economic gains, economic rationalizations, technical goals/standards, 
and/or efficiency in the broadest sense? 
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Constituents 
“Constituents” antecedent characterize who is exerting the pressure on the fund. 
· Multiplicity         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
Implication of adherence to SMP in terms of patterns of demands or expectation vis-à-vis your fund (i.e. clear expectations/prescriptions, coherent norms, 
compatible demands)? 
Implication of adherence to SMP for patterns of interactions with different national or international actors (please provide example)? 
· Dependence         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
Implication of adherence to SMP for your dependence on various external actors/organizations (e.g. certifying bodies, regulatory agencies, multilateral 
organizations)? 
The discretion or ability afforded to comply with or resist the demand associated with SMP as well as the availability of other alternative standards? 
 
Content 
“Content” antecedent explains to what norms or requirements the fund is being pressured to conform. 
· Consistency         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
The degree of fit between requirements/stipulations of SMP and internal fund vision/goals/interests/and aspirations? 
The extent to which the expectations of SMP are compatible with internal logic of operations, technical and economic standards, stewardship 
goals/aspirations? 
· Constraint         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
Implications of SMP for discretion, latitude and autonomy in decision making in relation to fund-environment relations? 
The extent to which your fund has retained control in determining its decisions in key areas addressed by SMP? 
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Control 
“Control” antecedent clarifies how or by what means the pressures are being exerted. 
· Coercion         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
The extent to which SMP is considered to be equivalent to the force of law? 
The extent to which compliance with SMP is considered to be highly punitive and strictly enforced? 
The extent to which compliance with SMP is scrutinized by regulatory agencies? 
· Diffusion         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
The extent to which the norms and expectations of SMP are considered highly diffused, supported, and accepted? 
The extent to which the social validity of SMP is by now largely unquestioned, and it has acquired a rule like status in social thought and action? 
Views of the number and characteristics of other funds that have adopted SMP, and the extent to which "the contagion of legitimacy" is salient? 
 
Context 
“Context” antecedent explains what is the environmental context within which societal performance monitoring pressures are being exerted. 
· Uncertainty         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
The extent to which the organizational field of SMP is considered highly uncertain, and changes in the field to be rapid and not entirely predictable? 
The extent to which there is a perceived need for increased security, stability, and predictability in relation to SMP diffusion patterns and institutionalization? 
· Interconnectedness        Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
The extent to which funds adhering to SMP feel inter-connected by values, norms, shared information, relational channels, and coordination mechanisms? 
The extent to which adherence to SMP requires coordination and negotiation, regular exchange, and inter-organizational linkages? 
